Introduction
In the past three decades, telecommunications regulation has often crossed ways with antitrust tools: suffice it to recall that the US telecoms sector was regulated for many years by the outcome of an antitrust case -the AT&T breakup in 1982. In the European Union, the 1998 regulatory framework already introduced competition policy tools in the regulation of telecommunications, and the 1998 Access notice was issued by the European Commission for the purpose of, i.a., -set out access principles stemming from Community competition law as shown in a large number of Commission decisions in order to create greater market certainty and more stable conditions for investment and commercial initiative in the telecoms and multimedia sectors‖, as well as to define the boundaries between ex ante regulation and ex post competition law enforcement 1 . Today, the 2002 -new‖ regulatory framework for e-communications largely relies on the concept of dominance (translated into Significant Market Power, SMP) as a precondition for the application of remedies by national regulators, and explicitly refers to Community competition law -thus, Article 82 of the EU Treaty -to define the features of SMP. Many other regulatory frameworks for e-communications worldwide rely on the use of antitrust tools to liberalise the telecommunications sector and gradually leave it subject only to ex post competition policy.
imposing liability explicitly under the rubric of the essential facilities doctrine, every circuit court of appeals has done so explicitly 11 .
With the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the concept of an essential facility (or -bottleneck‖) was put at the core of the regulatory approach, with the imposition of the obligation to unbundle network elements (UNE). More in detail, the 1996
Telecommunications Act directed the FCC to issue regulations requiring incumbent local exchange carriers (-ILECs‖) to lease -unbundled‖ elements of their local networks to competitors at regulated rates. The Act also required incumbents to lease the entire suite of network elements necessary to provide local telephone service-the -unbundled network element platform‖ (-UNEP‖).
As a result, the RBOCs were finally allowed to enter lucrative long-distance markets under the condition that they provided unbundled access to any entrant that wished to use part of their networks (the so-called Unbundled Network Elements or UNE) at just, reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions, based on the so-called TELRIC pricing. 12 The 1996 Act, initially welcomed with enthusiasm as a -Camelot moment‖, soon proved to be inadequate to efficiently regulate the fast-changing US telecom industry. 13 The two main problems emerged where the following:
 mandatory unbundling obligations have been increasingly considered as an insurmountable hurdle for investments in (DSL) broadband deployment by RBOCs. In this respect, many economists have highlighted that charges to access the incumbents' UNE were insufficient to reward investments in infrastructure. 14  the so-called -silos‖ approach adopted by the Act -in which each type of service (broadcasting, telephony, cable television, information services) is subject to its own regulatory structure -seems to have hampered the levelplaying field, by creating an artificial -regulatory apartheid‖ between sectors 11 See Elhauge, Defining better monopolization standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 261-62 (2003) . And Spencer Weber Waller and William Tasch, Harmonizing Essential Facilities and Refusals to Deal, supra note 8. 12 TELRIC stands for Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost. 13 Senate Commerce Committee Hearing, Voice over Internet Protocol, Feb. 24, 2004. 14 See, e.g., Hausman-Sidak subject to common carriage obligations under Title II of the 1934 Act (the wireline companies); and sectors falling under Title III (which include satellite and wireless) and under Title VI (cable), which were generally exempted from common carriage obligations 15 .
Needless to say, the application of the essential facilities doctrine in the 1996
Telecommunications Act was hampered by this -regulatory apartheid‖: whether a facility is replicable is indeed a question that depends on how the relevant market is defined: if the telecoms broadband network is kept artificially separated from the cable one, then viable replication ends up being confined to the replication of that same network, rather than deployment of alternative infrastructure that could compete with the copper one.
In any event, the FCC gradually moved to eliminate regulatory apartheid by reaching a more technology-neutral regulatory framework: after declaring cable 16 . A ‗hands-off' approach to regulation was also applied to other high-speed technologies and IP-enabled services such as VoIP 17 . In summary, the US have reached a greater degree of technological neutrality than initially achieved with the 1996 Act. Such neutrality comes close to creating the level-playing field that is needed for 15 The definition of -regulatory apartheid‖ was given by Peter Huber, quoted in Thomas W. Hazlett, Explaining the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Comment on Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 217 (1996) . 16 SBC Communications announced investments of $4-6 billion, Verizon planned investments totalling $15-20 billion and other providers, including incumbents like BellSouth, followed a similar strategy by announcing investments of $3-4 billion. Some commentators have argued that investments by regional incumbents (RBOCs) would have taken place anyway, given the intense competitive pressure exerted by cable operators, and were not significantly affected by the FCC announcements. 17 The FCC has taken advantage of its legacy -silos approach‖ by classifying VoIP as an -interstate information service‖ back in November 2004, therefore exempting it from state regulation just as cable modem services. More recently, the FCC started its IP-Enabled Services Proceeding in order to assess whether VoIP is to be considered a telecom or an information service.
infrastructure-based competition and fast, almost universal broadband coverage. As a result, although lifting up regulation for investments in highspeed technologies might hamper access and investment by foreign players, such an approach appears to fit the US telecoms sector, due to legacy infrastructure-based competition.
Where did this leave the essential facilities doctrine? The evolution of the US approach to telecoms regulation was inevitably linked to the reconsideration of Stating that the USTA II case marked the demise of the essential facility doctrine as a whole in the US would probably go too far. Important court decisions, such as the Microsoft III final judgment, came close to an application of the doctrine: Microsoft eventually committed to provide access at nondiscriminatory conditions to anybody who requested interoperability with Windows 18 . In the telecoms sector, it is probably more correct to observe that the application of the essential facilities doctrine was flawed, as the US regulatory regime had confined it into the very tight boundaries of the -silos approach‖.
However, a stronger wave of attacks soon came from the Supreme Court during the Bush Jr. administration, in particular with the Supreme Court decision in Verizon v. Trinko, where the Roberts Court established an important rule on the relationship between antitrust laws and sector-specific regulation in the field of telecommunications. The asset at hand in Trinko was exactly the UNE: a customer of the incumbent local phone service monopolist had brought a 18 See Renda, Catch me if you can, ... private antitrust class action arguing that Verizon had denied competitors access to interconnection support services which impaired their ability to deliver, hence the customer's ability to obtain, local telephone service in the downstream market. The Supreme Court ruled that, where a government agency has powers to enforce access to a facility, the antitrust essential facilities doctrine does not apply. The Trinko decision thus entails that in the telecommunications sector, the application of the essential facilities doctrine relies entirely on the shoulders of the sectoral regulator, and should not be approached under the Sherman Act. 19 The Court judges clearly stated that "We have never recognized such a doctrine, and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it here" 20 .
More specifically, the Supreme Court observed that, if it is in the FCC's competence to impose a sharing obligation, antitrust rules should not be juxtaposed with the regulator's decision not to impose access. In a nutshell, this means that, if the FCC has decided to lift access obligations on telcos, no essential facilities doctrine could be evoked to mandate access to the telco's network. The Trinko decision might be viewed as merely stating that sectoral regulation and antitrust law should be kept separate and should not overlap, in line with a general approach that has been adopted by US courts under the past decade, e.g. in the Credit Suisse decision. However, the skepticism towards the essential facilities doctrine seemed to be expressed rather generally by the Roberts Court: as two authors have recently stated, the decision marked -the near extinction‖ of the doctrine 21 .
Most recently, the attacked continued with the Department of Justice Report on single-firm conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, in which the same arguments were reiterated with even stronger emphasis 22 In a nutshell, during the Bush Jr. administration the dominant approach in the US was that, if access to essential inputs is to be applied in the telecommunications sector, it is up to the FCC to consider it, and antitrust law cannot overlap with this decision. Against this background, the decisions by the They alleged that AT&T refused to deal with the plaintiffs, denied the plaintiffs access to essential facilities, and engaged in a price squeeze. The Supreme Court could not directly apply Trinko as that case dealt with wholesale prices, and did not cover price squeeze allegations; however, the Chief Justice Roberts took the chance to clarify that -[i]n this case, as in Trinko, the defendant has no antitrust duty to deal with its rivals at wholesale; any such duty arises only from FCC regulations, not from the Sherman Act‖ 24 . Even more explicitly, concurring Judge Breyer observed that, in his view, -a purchaser from a regulated firm (which, if a natural monopolist, is lawfully such) cannot win an antitrust case simply by showing that it is ‗squeezed' between the regulated firm's wholesale 23 Id. at 129. 24 Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc'ns, Inc., No. 07-512 (2009). price (to the plaintiff) and its retail price (to customers for whose business both firms compete)‖. Moreover, -[w]hen a regulatory structure exists to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm, the costs of antitrust enforcement are likely to be greater than the benefits‖ 25 .
To sum up, it is fair to state that the essential facilities doctrine in the US has become only a regulatory issue, and only a narrowband story. It is not applied to broadband, and it was officially rejected by antitrust authorities. Center's report will contribute to a change of attitude by US regulators vis à vis access policy in fixed-line (and even mobile) infrastructure, it remains to be seen.
The essential facilities doctrine in Europe: alive and kicking
The early developments of the essential facilities doctrine in the US had a remarkable influence in Europe, where the doctrine was welcome and applied by the European Court of Justice in a number of cases, initially related to port infrastructure (Sea Containers/Sealink, Europort AS/DBS) and then expanded to other network industries, including gas (Tiercé Ladbroke). Overall, the essential facilities doctrine was integrated into the doctrine of refusal to deal with competitors, and in the application of refusal to supply customers with an essential input. Since the late 1990s, the essential facilities doctrine surfaced in cases related to media distribution (Bronner) and copyright, where it was applied by EU Courts in a number of cases -Magill, IMS Health, and eventually in the landmark case against Microsoft. In these cases, the conditions that must be met for a finding of abuse of dominance were clarified. Overall, a refusal to supply by a dominant undertaking is considered to constitute an abuse of dominance whenever (i) the refusal falls on an essential asset (or in Microsoft,  A refusal to supply may lead to consumer harm where the price in the upstream input market is regulated, the price in the downstream market is not regulated and the dominant undertaking, by excluding competitors on the downstream market through a refusal to supply, is able to extract more profits in the unregulated downstream market than it would otherwise do.

The Commission is open to considering any claim that an obligation to deal with competitors would stifle incentives to invest in the future. The access price set by the Commission thus will, in principle, -allow the dominant undertaking to realise an adequate return on the investments required to develop its input business, thus generating incentives to continue to invest in the future, taking the risk of failed projects into account‖.
All these statements show that the essential facility doctrine is deeply rooted in Community antitrust law, and is increasingly considered by the European Commission in its analysis of refusals to deal by dominant undertakings. This is also reflected in recent case law on margin squeeze. For example, in the Deutsche Telekom case 33 , the Commission demonstrated that there was no alternative to Deutsche Telekom's local loop access for competitors, although this analysis was carried out at the market definition stage rather than in the assessment of whether essential facility criteria were met.
The success of the essential facilities doctrine in Europe can also be ascribed to the different approach adopted by EU institutions in the application of competition law, and in particular to the oft-quoted -ordoliberal‖ roots of Article 82 34 , which led EU trustbusters to pursue the openness of markets to the largest possible number of competitors where possible. According to some authors, reliance on a structuralist approach to antitrust policy has led EU competition authorities to go well beyond the concept of essential facility, bordering on what has been termed -convenient facility‖ doctrine 35 . Especially in Microsoft, the Commission has shown its intention to go beyond the exceptional circumstances However, the -ONP‖ era did not succeed in boosting competition in telecoms markets in Europe, just as the -UNE‖ era had failed in the US 36 . However, while in the US the reaction was to abandon access policy in favour of regulatory holidays, also due to the existence of a legacy cable infrastructure and emerging wireless broadband platforms, in Europe the reaction was completely different. NRAs that less intrusive solutions would not achieve the desired result. The revised text adopted by the Commission after the parliament's vote at the end of 2008 states that in exceptional cases, functional separation -may be justified as a remedy where there has been persistent failure to achieve effective nondiscrimination in several of the markets concerned, and where there is little or no prospect of infrastructure competition within a reasonable timeframe after recourse to one or more remedies previously considered to be appropriate‖. At the same time, the text calls for a careful consideration of -the incentives of the concerned undertaking to invest in its network‖, as well as the risk of any potential negative effects on consumer welfare. 38 New market 4 is now defined as -Wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access (including shared or fully unbundled access) at a fixed location‖.
Against this background, it bears observing that the inclusion of functional separation in the Access Directive confirms the European attitude towards the imposition of structural remedies to address market failures. This trendconfirmed, although in different form, also with the imposition of unbundling obligations in the Microsoft Windows Media Player case -shows that, when it comes to essential facilities, the US and the EU are not converging. Rather, a continental drift can be observed, with the two systems proceeding in completely opposite directions.
In conclusion, in Europe the essential facilities doctrine applies both to narrowband and broadband communications, regardless of the technology used; it applies both ex ante (under the regulatory framework for ecommunications) and ex post (under Article 82 of the EU Treaty). However, both the antitrust approach to essential facilities and the practical implementation of the regulatory framework for e-communications have led Europe to move beyond the strict application of the essential facilities doctrine, towards a situation in which facilities that are only -convenient‖, rather than -essential‖, can be subject to mandatory access or compulsory licensing.
Essential facilities around the world
In EU member states, competition authorities and national courts apply 44 Paragraph (ii) of this definition is broader than the previous definition, which applied only to facilities provided on a -monopoly basis‖, The new definition requires non-monopoly facilities to be provided to competitors if the Commission determines, based on its assessment of market between essential facilities, conditional essential facilities, conditional mandated non-essential facilities public goods and mandatory interconnection services, differentiating regulatory remedies for each of these categories.
In Japan, the concept of essential facilities is explicitly referred to in the telecommunications law, which leads to the designation of those markets that warrant regulated wholesale access. In addition, the Japanese Fair Trade Also other countries (e.g. many African countries, Turkey, etc.) systematically apply the essential facilities doctrine both in general competition law and in the regulation of electronic communications.
Essential facilities and telecoms: nemo propheta in patria?
The previous sections looked at the birth and evolution of the essential facilities doctrine, and found a rather surprising result: despite the fact that it was elaborated in the US, the essential facilities doctrine seems to have survived and permeated the regulatory framework for e-communications and the enforcement of competition laws mostly outside the United States. As a matter of fact, looking at the liberalization of telecommunications worldwide, reliance conditions, that withdrawal of mandatory access would likely result in a "substantial lessening or prevention of competition." This language, which seems to be based on the abuse of dominance provisions in Section 79 of the Competition Act, establishes a fairly subjective test, and future regulatory litigation can be expected before its interpretation is settled. on the essential facilities doctrine appears still extensive, with applications that are not limited to traditional narrowband infrastructures, but also cover mandatory access to high-speed broadband.
The case of Europe is probably the most interesting from this viewpoint. In the Old Continent, the essential facilities doctrine can be defined as the -spinal tap‖ of the current regulatory framework; and even when access obligations are not imposed by NRAs, competition authorities can step in and challenge dominant firms' conduct if it is likely to lead to anticompetitive foreclosure. In this context, the expansion of the essential facilities doctrine to fibre infrastructures appears inevitable, also due to the extension of the scope of former market 11.
And given the emphasis currently put on the need to stimulate investment in NGNs by mandating the sharing of passive infrastructures (ducts, masts, etc.), the application of the essential facilities doctrine seems likely to be given even more importance in the years to come.
The stark divergence between the treatment of the essential facilities doctrine in the US and EU certainly deserves closer scrutiny. US authorities -both the DoJ and the FCC -seem to concur that applying the essential facilities doctrine can lead to significant uncertainty, hampers incentives to invest and leads to the protection of competitors, rather than competition in the interest of end consumers. On the other hand, EU antitrust and telecoms policy are aligned in their reliance on the essential facility doctrine. In the next section, we assess whether this divergence can have significant policy impacts in the years to come.
The table below summarizes national experiences with the essential facilities doctrine in the telecoms field and in general antitrust policy. As shown in the table, very much is left of the essential facilities doctrines in telecoms regulation around the world. However, in the US too little attention has been devoted to the virtues of the doctrine in the past few years -and a reconsideration of the hostile approach of the past few years is very likely in the next few months; at the same time, in the EU the enthusiasm for the theoretical appeal of regulated access to infrastructure has led the Commission and other institutions to exaggerate in mandating access to existing or future networks, or even to assets or information that could at best be considered useful -neither indispensable, nor impossible to replicate -for competitors. 
Not applicable
Even if the debate on essential facilities seems at least as important in an NGA environment as it was for old-generation telecoms regulation, this does not mean that the terms of the debate are the same. A first, very important difference is that during the past two decades the main policy challenge in this field has been liberalization: accordingly, policymakers focused in particular on the need to open existing facilities to newcomers, in order to facilitate their entry on the market. Access policy was thus related to existing facilities in the network, which were undergoing a transition from monopoly to competition.
Today, the issue is completely different: as one of the top European players has recently stated before the European Regulators' Group, the only legacy advantage given by a metallic local loop considered as an essential facility is the so-called subloop, which is already being regulated. Besides this, -new infrastructures should be considered as an investment opportunity and cannot be seen, by definition, as an essential facility‖ 45 . In other words, while the theoretical framework for access to essential facilities has been conceived to regulate a situation where an incumbent player can exploit a legacy advantage over prospective new entrants, the NGA debate looks at -future essential facilities‖, which for the most part still have to be built. This is why the debate has become so intriguing today, and so difficult to solve. Is there such thing like a -future essential facility‖?
As regards the infrastructure layer, the -new essential facilities‖ are being broken down into various categories, and policy is now focusing on various degrees of sharing. In particular, the most important distinction is certainly between -passive‖ and -active‖ infrastructure sharing. The former type is the most often associated to the essential facilities concept, especially as regards the need to introduce obligations to share civil engineering infrastructures 46 A first case has already emerged in France, where Free charged France Telecom for abuse of dominant position in refusing to give its competitors access to its civil engineering infrastructures, which would allow them to deploy their own fibre-optic telecommunications network. In January 2008 the Conseil de la Concurrence dismissed Free's request for interim measures but decided to investigate further the case on the merits. The decision bears a key importance on Free's future reliance on FT'0s infrastructure, or on an own infrastructure. However, The Conseil considered that France new European Commission recommendation on relevant markets already explains that -[a]s networks evolve in most Member States and existing metallic loops are replaced partially, or even totally, by fibre, the existing local loop may become significantly shorter than today's local loops, or even entirely disappear.
In such cases, where no alternative infrastructure is likely to become available to allow replication, then access to either ducts or alternative network elements must be considered. Access to ducts could be an important part of any remedy imposed to address problems associated with physical network access.‖ 47 The ERG has also clarified that -NGA investments are likely to reinforce the importance of scale and scope economies, thereby reducing the degree of replicability, potentially leading to an enduring economic bottleneck‖. This last statement seems to pave the way for a massive application of the essential facilities doctrine in an NGA environment 48 . Countries that have already mandated or plan to mandate access to passive infrastructure include Belgium and Italy (only access to ducts and dark fibre); France (sharing of ducts and inbuilding fiber); Denmark and Germany (access to ducts and dark fiber, and subloop unbundling); and Spain (sharing of in-building fiber, access to ducts and dark fiber, and subloop unbundling). On the other hand, mandatory sharing of active infrastructure is currently limited to bitstream access over NGA in a few countries (Belgium, Denmark, Spain, UK).
Moreover, the essential facilities debate is evolving into even more prospective and less tangible assets. In particular, once telecoms services will have migrated to an all-IP environment, ISP platforms in heavily concentrated markets may also be subject to mandatory access policy: the current trend towards mandatory net neutrality obligations in the US and Europe testifies of an increasing attention towards access of new entrants at higher layers of the value chain, i.e. applications and services. If markets will be defined in a very Telecom's holding of civil engineering infrastructures is likely to give the company a particular responsibility, notably including not to distort the play of competition on the very high speed budding markets in keeping for itself the use of the infrastructures and refusing its competitors to use them, or giving them a discriminatory access.
technology specific way, and incumbent players in those markets will retain a significant market share, then their all-IP platforms will be seen as essential  Even if players decide that they are willing to invest, the concomitant regulation of the infrastructure layer (through access policy) and the higher layers (through mandatory net neutrality) may hamper the business case for such investment. As a matter of fact, practically the only revenue source left 49 Renda, etc. and forthcoming 50 for investors to strike the break-even in an ideal business plan would be increasing monthly subscriptions for end users, something that cannot be done ad libitum, if the platform is to be successful.
Finally, the financial turmoil that has originated from the subprime mortgage crisis has instilled a sense of further urgency in the debate over NGA deployment. Investment in new telecom infrastructure is increasingly seen as a much needed counter-cyclical thrust for the real economy 51 . Accordingly, there seems to be little time to solve the essential facility puzzle: if the new networks are so similar to public goods -because future access policy will make them non-rival and non-excludable from the perspective of incumbents -then public money can be thrown on the table to convince investors. And this is the approach that seems to be emerging at least in Europe, as will be explained in the next section. The first document clearly states that access to civil engineering infrastructure (ducts, poles etc) should be mandated on a cost-oriented basis and in accordance with the principles of equivalence. Interestingly, the Commission also states that effective physical access remedies might render imposition of an obligation of wholesale broadband access unnecessary, especially where access to the unbundled fibre loop is available, and in particular on a point-to-point basis. In this respect, the Commission's approach seems to create different layers of essential facilities: if the passive infrastructure layer is already subject to mandatory sharing obligations, then the other elements (e.g. active infrastructure elements) will not be considered as essential facilities, and as such will not be subject to network sharing obligations. However, new access remedies in terms of interfaces for interconnection of optical networks and bitstream remedies may be required: in particular, wholesale bitstream access prices should be cost-oriented with different prices for different bitstream products to the extent that such price differences can be justified by the underlying costs of service provision. This basic rule faces exemptions when there is a proven track record of functional separation that has resulted in fully equivalent access to NGA and where there is a sufficient competitive constraint on the operator's downstream arm.
Mandating access to new networks: the European
In addition, the Commission clarified that cost-oriented access to the unbundled fibre loop should be provided in the case of co-investment into FTTH; but with no requirement for cost orientation where: (i) the SMP operator has jointly with at least one other provider of electronic communications services competing on the downstream market deployed an FTTH network; (ii) the co-investors deploy multiple fibre lines; (iii) the co-investment project is not exclusive (timely notice should be given to potentially interested parties who could participate on the same terms and conditions); and (iv) all co-investors enjoy equivalent access to the jointly deployed infrastructure. This, in turn, means that the Commission is considering access obligations from a sequential perspective: the same network infrastructure will be subject to different regulatory regimes, depending on its ownership and openness of the deployment process. In case of open, transparent co-investment, cost-oriented access charges will not be imposed.
At the same time, the Commission guidelines on state aids for broadband deployment distinguish between white, grey and black geographic areas. White areas are rural and scarcely populated zones in which no broadband infrastructure exists or is likely to be developed. State support in these areas is generally regarded as compatible with the provisions of the EC Treaty provided that certain proportionality conditions are respected. An area where an NGA network does not currently exist and where privately funded NGA networks are not likely to be operational in a period of 3 years is regarded as a white NGA area. Public authorities are entitled to intervene in these areas, although if this corresponds to a traditionally grey area, the Member State must demonstrate that the broadband services provided by incumbents do not satisfy the needs of the users in that area, and that there are no less distortive means to accomplish the same goals.
Black areas are characterized by the availability of broadband services over at least two competing NGA infrastructures (although it is not clear whether 4G
wireless will be considered as a competing infrastructure). The Commission is skeptical about the need for public intervention in these areas and considers that it may crowd out private investment and distort competition. Hence, unless a clearly demonstrated market failure is identified, State measures for the deployment of broadband infrastructure in these areas will be viewed negatively.
Finally, the Commission defines grey areas as those where broadband services are offered to users, but only one network operator is present. Public funding of broadband networks in these areas requires a more detailed assessment in order to determine whether (1) affordable and adequate services are already offered to all potential users and (2) the same goals can be reached by means of less distortive measures. Grey NGA areas are those in which only one network is in place or is being deployed and there are no plans for the rollout of another one in the coming five years. Public investment in these areas deserves careful analysis. In particular, the compatibility of the State intervention requires that the Member State demonstrates that the existing (or planned) NGA network is not enough to satisfy the needs of users in that area, and that there are not less distortive means to reach the same goals.
The distinction between black, grey and white areas recalls the taxonomy of -2.x‖, -1.x‖ and -0.x‖ areas proposed by Professor Eli Noam a few years ago.
However, the Commission goes beyond this taxonomy by postulating that state intervention may be required to subsidize the entry of new infrastructure players both where there are no NGA networks at all, and when there is only one infrastructure in place (and there is reason to believe that it is not sufficient).
This goes way beyond the essential facilities doctrine and is partly incompatible with it, for the following reasons.
First, the Guidelines award broadband networks a status of services of general economic interest. As such, the Commission Guidelines explicitly require that any new state-funded network is -available for all interested operators‖ and is -based on the provision of a passive, neutral and open access infrastructure‖. This, in turn, means that such networks should provide access seekers with all possible forms of network access and allow effective competition at the retail level, ensuring the provision of competitive and affordable services to end-users.
These include, for ADSL networks, bitstream and full unbundling, whereas for NGA fibre-based networks at least access to dark fibre, bitstream, and if a FTTC network is being deployed, access to sub loop unbundling should be provided.
Second, the Commission Guidelines also foresee potential discrimination at higher layers, and mandates that where state-funded networks involve the creation of a vertically integrated broadband operator, adequate safeguards should be put in place to avoid any conflict of interest, undue discrimination and any other hidden indirect advantages.  There could well be situations in which two infrastructure players compete in the market, but one of them is state-funded (grey areas that become black after public investment). Even in these cases, both players will be subject to mandatory network sharing obligations, despite the fact than none of them can be defined as an essential facility.
Conclusion: the new essential facilities doctrine
As we have shown in the previous sections, the essential facility doctrine lies at the core of telecoms regulation since the very beginning of the liberalization process. The original focus on enduring economic bottlenecks, however, was soon found to require too significant upfront investments for new entrants, and has been progressively expanded to cover access obligations to network elements that could even be considered as substitutes from an antitrust perspective (e.g. bitstream access and LLU), and cases in which mandatory access did not really reflect the -essentiality‖ of the element at hand.
Later, the failure of the stepping stones approach in the US has suggested a U- Accordingly, until a few months ago, the essential facility doctrine was basically dead in the US, and alive and kicking in the EU and in many other regions, where the regulatory approach even stretched the concept of essential facilities by mandating access to various (replicable) network elements, and in some cases even requiring functional separation of the incumbent's network operations (e.g.in the UK, Sweden, Italy). Available data so far has suggested that aggressive access policy -which goes beyond the mere application of the essential facility doctrine -has resulted in excessive service-based competition in many countries, with low prices emerging together with low investment and speed. At the same time, countries that have deviated from this track to protect investment exhibit higher prices, but also better infrastructure.
Today, the debate features entirely new flavours. First of all, in an NGA environment the unbundled elements are different, and are mostly represented by passive infrastructure (ducts, masts, antennas), rather than fibre loops.
Second, the essential nature of these facilities is very hard to assess, but seems widely acknowledged by regulators around the world. Third, the essential facilities to be regulated are in many cases not existing, but only prospective, which calls for public intervention to solve the chicken/egg dilemma. Fourth, the net neutrality debate affects the viability of new investment even more, and may require even more massive public intervention if net neutrality is mandated by regulation on NGA networks. Finally, the emerging consensus -also in the US -is again in favour of asymmetric access-based regulation, mostly relying on LRIC pricing, possibly with a higher cost of capital that reflects the high risk of these investments.
Where will this all lead? The overall impression is that the pendulum will swing again between the open access debate (which tends to exaggerate the reliance on essential, as well as -convenient‖ facilities) and the regulatory holidays debate.
To be sure, the essential facilities doctrine continues to stand in the middle between these two extremes, and may emerge again as a potential third paradigm for regulating access to telecoms networks. Should this occur, the role of ex ante, umbrella regulation would be minimized as compared to that of caseby-case, ex post competition assessment. In a world of competing (fixed and mobile) infrastructures, perhaps a more careful reconsideration of what the original doctrine actually meant is the only way to strike the balance between competition and incentives to invest.
